SOPHIE'S WORLD
(Sofies verden), by Jostein Gaarder (JG), translated from Norwegian into American by Paulette Møller (PM)Guestbook | Guestmap | Discussion forum | Inspired by...
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35
| CH = chapter, P = page, L = line, C = comment, N = Norwegian, T = (alternative) translation, usually closer to the original text, TTR = Two-Tier Reality (metaphysical system bridging East and West) |
||||||||
CHAPTER 27: HEGEL (PP299-308) |
||||||||
|
||||||||
| P299 L2: Her thoughts were in a turmoil T: Up there, something was going round and round C: ?! L4: Now her father really had made (T: had really managed to make) her head swim L9: harm T: curl L13: ought to T: could L18: plan T: trick/stratagem L19: She got up and went to look out T: went to the window and looked out L20: over toward T: down to L28: facing T: looking out over | ||||||||
| P300 L7: assistant professor T: senior lecturer ('Dozent') L10: (Berlin) ... the spiritual center of Europe T: a spiritual centre in Germany L15: surfaced T: arisen L22: Only man has a "spirit" C: Gaia? L23: the progress (T: path/development) of world spirit throughout history C: Change, yes; progress, maybe L26: spooky T: ghostly L26(cont): It is not (T: no longer) lying in wait (anymore) L30: admitted T: accepted L30: (Kant) there exists a kind of unattainable "truth" C: No L31(cont): Hegel said that "truth is subjective", thus rejecting the existence of any "truth" above or beyond human reason. All knowledge is human knowledge C: Yes, indeed; cf. TTR L34: the philosophers T: philosophy L35: perhaps you could say (T: put it like) that L35: Hegel's philosophy was so all-embracing and diversified T: complex and nuanced L37: highlighting T: stressing L37: aspects T: points L40: progress (T: development) of history | ||||||||
| P301 L1: That's not unimportant T: That can perhaps be important enough L3: the attempt to set up T: an attempt to establish L6: they had all made pronouncements on the timeless factor (T: spoken of timeless aspects) of human knowledge of the world L9: (Hegel) believed that the basis of human cognition changed from one generation to the next C: It also changes from one society to the next - and from one person to the next L10(cont): There were therefore no "eternal truths" C: Except for negative truths like that one; cf. TTR L11(cont): (There was) no timeless reason C: Meaning?! L11(cont): The only fixed point philosophy can hold on to is history itself C: Meaning obscure. Sophie asks for an explanation, but Alberto's 'explanation' is inadequate L19: to Hegel, history was like a running (T: the course of a) river L24: I get it T: understand L28: You can ... never claim that any particular thought is correct (T: right) for ever and ever C: Agreed L29(cont): But the thought can be correct from where you stand C: But only subjectively correct for a particular person and not necessarily correct for a contemporary. However widespread or popular or 'accepted' they may be, no moral principles are universal (i.e. correct for everybody) at any particular moment in history LL33-40: some things (T: something) can be right or wrong in relation to a certain historical context C: Text gives slavery and deliberate forest-burning as examples. Hegel's arguments are ethically repugnant: if slavery is wrong today, it was wrong '2500 years ago', regardless of whether a person advocating or condemning it is 'considered' or 'thought' foolish or otherwise by the 'public opinion' of a particular historical period. The same applies to forest-burning, whose present 'unreasonableness' is in any case judged differently in Europe and in Brazil. Would Hegel have given the Holocaust his moral support because it was 'not considered unreasonable' in Nazi Germany to eliminate undesirable ethnic minorities? L41: (Today) we have a completely different - and better - basis for such judgments C: Different, no doubt; better, not necessarily. The last century has shown conclusively that "later in history" does not imply "morally superior" | ||||||||
| P302 L2: the "truth" is this same process, since there are no criteria beyond the historical process itself that can determine what is the most true or the most reasonable C: So Hegel proposes degrees of truth and of reasonableness! His position seems to imply that no moral judgement can be made of historical processes and developments L6: You cannot single out particular thoughts from antiquity ... and say they were right or wrong C: Of course you can, if that is your opinion. L8: you cannot say that Plato was wrong and that Aristotle was right C: I can and do L10: That would be an antihistorical way of thinking C: How awful! But 'anti-historical' means no more than 'anti-Hegelian': Hegel drapes a grand cloak of objectivity over his highly subjective philosophical ideas L12(cont): No (C: No?!), it doesn't sound right T: That doesn't sound so good L13: You cannot detach any philosopher, or any thought at all, from that philosopher's or that thought's historical context C: But people do 'detach' philosophers and thoughts, despite Hegel's - or Alberto's - disapproval, and the world still goes on turning, even though the idea of terrestrial revolution has here been adduced without reference to its historical context L15: because something new is always being added, reason is progressive. In other words (C: rather different words), human knowledge is constantly expanding and progressing C: Information and knowledge are as essential to the human being as water, but if you drink too much, you burst L18(cont): Does that mean that Kant's philosophy is nevertheless more right than Plato's? T: And then Kant's philosophy is perhaps more right than Plato's after all? L20(cont): Yes. The world spirit has developed - and progressed (T: expanded) - from Plato to Kant C: So Wittgenstein and Sartre are 'more right' than Kant - and Hegel? L23: over a thousand (T: two thousand) years L34: human culture and human development have made the world spirit increasingly conscious of its intrinsic value T: own significance C: Has all this any real meaning or is it just romantic mythologising? L37(cont): How could he be so sure of that? C: Good question, Sophie! L38(cont): He claimed it as a historical reality C: Ah, that explains everything! L41: the study of history shows that humanity is moving toward greater rationality and freedom C: Heil Hitler! L42(cont): In spite of all its capers (T: deviations), historical development is progressive C: In other words, it goes forward because it can't go backward | ||||||||
| P303 L1(cont): We say that history is purposeful C: No - apart from giving historians something to do L6: as soon as (C: ?! Eventually, rather) one thought is proposed, it will be contradicted by another C: Can all thoughts/ideas be contradicted? L7(cont): A tension arises between these two opposite ways of thinking C: 'Opposing', rather. 'Contradictory' is not necessarily 'opposite/contrary' L9: the best of both points of view C: Maybe. Who can say what is the 'best'? L11: Could you give (T: Have you) an example? L18: thesis T: 'position' L20: extreme (T: sharp) claim L21: negation C: or antithesis L24: pointed out C: asserted, rather L27: actually T: really L32: flowed T: changed L36: term T: expression L41: Kant agreed with the rationalists in some things and with the empiricists in others C: Then sentence omitted: T: He also showed that both had been mistaken on important points | ||||||||
| P304 L10: There it is again C: ?! T: I see L11: When we discuss something, we think dialectically C: Some do, occasionally L13: when we find flaws in an argument, we preserve the best of it C: Not necessarily: we may reject it completely. And who is to say that anything we preserve is 'the best'? L16: a socialist and a conservative ... tension ... between conflicting (C: but basically similar) modes of thought L19: It is possible that they are both partly right and partly wrong C: Or both wrong L20(cont): And as the argument evolves, the best of both arguments will often crystallize C: In Hegel's make-believe world L23: throes T: middle L24: it's up to history to decide what's right and what's wrong ... Whatever survives is right. Or ... that which is right survives C: If only! The fact that this irrational folderol was taken seriously, especially in Germany, helps to explain the catastrophic development of European history L36: people would no doubt cringe (T: be ashamed) if they saw in print what their grandfathers had said on (equality of the sexes) C: And our grandchildren may well feel ashamed when they read the 'reasons' put forward by today's adults for denying children's rights. | ||||||||
| P305 L1: (Hegel) The difference between man and woman (C: Qu'elle vive!) is like that between animals and plants. Men correspond to animals, while women correspond to plants C: What animal does Hegel correspond to? The chimera? L4: rather vague unity of feeling C: Rather vague, indeed L5: When (T: If) women hold the helm (T: reins) of government, the state is (at once) in jeopardy (T: danger), because women regulate their actions (T: operate) not by the demands of universality (T: by general rules) but by arbitrary inclinations and opinions C: Do you agree, O Great Oak Thatcher? LL1-11: C: So ... male thesis ... female antithesis ... human synthesis ... Nicht wahr, Herr Dozent? But Hegel failed to operate his own system, here where it was most needed L16: time T: history L21: Because (T: then) I would be exemplifying T: indicating L22: I could (T: not) say L23: Lots of people think this already C: Half-sentence omitted: T: so it would be a bad example L23(cont): But history will prove (T: show) that much of what we think is obvious will not hold up in the light (T: will not pass the test/judgement) of history L27: The many men in Hegel's time who could reel off gross broadsides (T: reeled off crass assertions) like that one on the inferiority of women hastened (T: helped to speed up) the development of feminism C: Some say 'Good old Hegel' L31: They proposed (T: put forward) a thesis L31(cont): Why? Because women (T: They needed to because women) had already begun to rebel L33: the more grossly (T: crassly) they expressed themselves ... the stronger became the negation T: opposition L38: they will have to face T: against them L40: a minute ago T: just now L41: From the point of view T: In terms of | ||||||||
| P306 L2: "being" T: existence L3: opposite concept ... "nothing" T: non-existence L5: The tension between "being" and "nothing" (C: What tension?) becomes (T: is) resolved in the concept of "becoming" C: Eh?! L6(cont): Because if something is in the process of becoming, it both is and is not C: is and is not comprehensible? L9: Hegel's "reason" is thus dynamic logic T: a dynamic reason L12: Niels Bohr is said to have told a story about Newton's having a (T: said to have had a) horseshoe over his front door C: There is no reference to Newton in the Norwegian text of the horseshoe story L18: Amazing T: I'm speechless C: Me too - or is that a 'dialectical contradiction in terms'? L23: there are also (the) profound truths, whose opposites are equally right C: Is that a profound truth? L33: Yes, do T: Go on L37: absolutely maddened T: irritated L38: overobedience T: constant obedience LL38/42: goody-goody T: obedient | ||||||||
| P307 L1: odd T: strange/remarkable L1: Maybe I would have slapped her anyway C: Dear sweet Sophie! L3: The dialectic tension had come to a point where (T: was so critical that) something had to happen T: change L5(cont): Like a slap in the face? T: Do you mean the slap? L13: among such powers (T: forces), Hegel emphasized the importance of the family, civil society and the state T: By that he meant the family and the state L14(cont): You might say that Hegel was somewhat skeptical of (T: squinted at) the individual C: So the individual has good reason to squint sceptically at Hegel L19: Reason manifests itself above all in language C: So does unreason, which Hegel's language is full of L21: Mr Hansen cannot manage without Norwegian C: Perhaps he speaks Danish? Or he could learn to speak English? L22(cont): It is thus not the individual who forms the language, it is the language which forms the individual C: The process works both ways. Language changes because people change it. Hegel's attitude is typically irrational L27: He who does not find his place within the state is therefore an unhistorical person C: An unhistorical person: a prime example of unreason in language. Clearly a person who needs to be sent to a concentration camp and made an unperson. Are you making notes, Adolf? L30: citizens are unthinkable without the state C: Citizens, yes; people, no L31(cont): Obviously T: I see C: Don't agree too easily, Sophie! Do you know how women are treated in totalitarian societies? By the way, is Alberto wearing a little moustache for this lesson? L33: Hegel says one cannot "resign from society" C: 'State' and 'society' are not synonyms L34(cont): Anyone ... who wants to "find their soul" (C: Poets? Hermits? Teenagers?) will therefore be ridiculed C: Hegel deserves to be given a dose of his own harsh medicine: not the compliment of dialectical opposition but the rebuff of undialectical ridicule L38: it is not the individual that finds itself, it is (T: finds his soul but) the world spirit LL41/42: stages T: steps | ||||||||
| P308 L1(cont): Which are? T: Just give me the whole staircase! LL3/4/9: spirit T: reason L7: And that is ... ? T: Now I am all agog! L10: knowledge T: reason L10: in philosophy, the world spirit reflects on its own impact on (T: activity in) history C: Meaning?! L14: think it over T: digest it L16: Philosophy is the mirror of the world spirit L17(cont): That was beautiful C: but meaningless - except to the peculiar Hegelian mind L22: cropping up T: being referred to L26: only Hilde knows T: can answer L31: overgrown T: precocious L34: You give me the shudders T: That's spine-chilling. | ||||||||